Previous papers that test whether sentiment is useful for predicting volatility ignore whether lagged returns information might also be useful for this purpose. By doing so, these papers potentially overestimate the role of sentiment in predicting volatility. In this paper we test whether sentiment is useful for volatility forecasting purposes. We find that most of our sentiment measures are caused by returns and volatility rather than vice versa. In addition, we find that lagged returns cause volatility. All sentiment variables have extremely limited forecasting power once returns are included as a forecasting variable.
Introduction
Whilst earlier papers have underplayed the importance of noise traders, more recent analysis has discussed how such traders acting on a noisy signal, such as sentiment, can induce systematic risk and affect asset prices in equilibrium. For example, De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) demonstrate that if risk averse arbitrageurs know that prices may diverge further away from fundamentals before they converge closer, they may take smaller positions when betting against mispricing. Thus if such uninformed noise traders base their trading decisions on sentiment, then measures of it may have predictive power for asset price behavior.
Most papers that test whether sentiment can predict returns or volatility motivate the relationship through the role of noise traders who respond to changes in sentiment influencing subsequent returns and volatility. If this is in fact what happens in practice, then it might be possible to use sentiment to forecast returns and volatility. 1 Causality must run from sentiment to market behavior if we accept the noise trader explanation. If we step back from the noise trader framework, however, and ask how sentiment might be generated, it is quite natural to expect that market behavior should influence sentiment. Evidence of this was found by Solt and Statman (1988) and Brown and Cliff (2004) who document that returns cause sentiment rather than vice versa. If returns have a strong impact on sentiment then it is also possible that volatility influences sentiment as well. If this is the case we might observe a much stronger link between sentiment and returns or volatility if we do not assume that sentiment is the causal variable. Thus it is clearly important to test for the direction of causality.
A failure to recognize the impact of market behavior on sentiment may also explain why all previous studies that test the predictive power of sentiment fail to include lagged volatility when predicting returns and omit lagged returns as an additional variable when predicting volatility. However, if sentiment responds to lagged volatility or lagged returns then it makes sense to include these variables to supplement any forecasting tests of sentiment. Doing so is likely to avoid overestimating the true forecasting power of sentiment.
We test these ideas at a market-wide level by first looking at whether aggregate sentiment measures cause the returns and the realized volatility of the S&P 100 index as predicted by the noise trader literature or whether sentiment simply responds to market behavior. In addition we test whether returns cause volatility.
2 After deciding on the variables that cause returns and volatility, we use these variables for forecasting.
This allows us to determine the incremental contribution of sentiment for forecasting.
The analysis is conducted on both a daily and weekly basis. In the daily analysis, the sentiment indicators used include the S&P 100 (OEX) put-call trading volume ratio (PCV), the OEX put-call open interest ratio (PCO), and the NYSE ARMS index. 3 In the weekly analysis, the sentiment indicators used consist of PCO and PCV and two sentiment ratios gathered through surveys by two different investment information providers. 4 As a number of papers have found a significant relationship between changes in sentiment and returns or volatility, we investigate both sentiment and its first differences.
Overall it is found that all sentiment measures are Granger-caused by returns and that many measures of sentiment are also caused by realized volatility. We show that the one sentiment measure, the ARMS index, which appears to consistently Grangercause volatility has only limited predictive power once returns are included.
This study makes two particular contributions. Firstly, it indicates that research that seeks to exploit the potential market impact of noise traders is unlikely to be successful for returns and volatility forecasting. Secondly, it clarifies the relationship between returns, sentiment and realized volatility. In particular our results show that it is returns rather than sentiment that contain useful information for volatility forecasting purposes.
This paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses why sentiment, returns and realized volatility might be related and how this relationship might manifest itself.
Section 3 presents the data and explains the choice of variables chosen to proxy for investor sentiment. The methods used to test whether market behavior causes investor sentiment or vice versa are presented in Section 4 with the results of these Granger causality tests. Section 5 presents the results of the volatility forecasting analysis.
Finally, conclusions are stated in Section 6. A few papers have also investigated the relationship between sentiment and volatility.
Theory & literature
Brown (1999) looks at whether investor sentiment levels are related to the volatility of closed-end fund returns. As measures of sentiment he uses both investor survey data and closed-end fund discounts. His results show that deviations from the mean level of sentiment are positively and significantly related to volatility during trading hours. Lee et al (2002) look at the relationship between volatility, returns and sentiment.
They estimate a GARCH-in-mean model which includes contemporaneous shifts in investor sentiment in the mean equation and lagged shifts in sentiment in the conditional volatility equation. They use the survey indicator provided by Investor's
Intelligence to examine the impact of changes in investor sentiment on the conditional volatilities of the DJIA, S&P 500, and NASDAQ indices, which are estimated from the GJR-GARCH model. They find that bullish (bearish) changes in sentiment result in downward (upward) adjustments in volatility.
In summary therefore the literature tells us that sentiment may be useful for forecasting volatility. It also tells us that this relationship may be influenced by the behavior of returns. In our empirical analysis we do two things. Firstly, we examine the causality relationship between returns, sentiment and volatility. Secondly, we examine whether sentiment measures are useful for forecasting returns and volatility.
In contrast to previous studies our analysis uses realized volatility rather than a latent volatility measure estimated using a time series model.
Data
The sample period used for daily data is from 1 February 1990 until 31 December 2001. Results are obtained for the full period and also for two sub-samples given by dividing the sample period into two equal parts around 11 January 1996. This allows us to assess whether the results are robust through time. The weekly data is for the slightly shorter period from 6 April 1990 to 28 December 2001 and it is also divided into two equal sub-samples.
We study measures of realized volatility, returns and indicators of market participants' sentiment at the daily and weekly frequencies. The methods used to gather this data and the measures of sentiment used are explained in this section.
Realized volatility
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) show that the squared return can be a highly noisy measure of the realized variance of a financial asset's return. However they also show that using the cumulative sum of high-frequency squared intraday returns can greatly mitigate the noisy component 5 . Five-minute S&P 100 index returns are used to calculate a measure of daily realized volatility in this paper, as the 5-minute frequency provides the best measure in Andersen and Bollerslev (1998 
ARMS index
The ARMS index on day t is equal to the number of advancing issues scaled by the trading volume (shares) of advancing issues divided by the number of declining issues scaled by the trading volume (shares) of declining issues. It is calculated as:
, and respectively denote the number of advancing issues, the number of declining issues, the trading volume of advancing issues, and the trading volume of declining issues. Table 1 contains summary statistics of all the variables discussed in this section. 12 The statistics are presented for the full period and for two sub-periods of equal duration.
The daily series of log realized volatility has high autocorrelations with a first-lag correlation of 0.73 for the full period. The weekly series of log realized volatility has a similar distribution to the daily series but has less kurtosis. Both daily and weekly returns display excess kurtosis, negative skewness and almost no serial correlation.
The levels of all the sentiment indicators display a skewed and leptokurtic pattern, whilst the first differences of all the indicators are also skewed and most are leptokurtic. All levels of sentiment indicators, except the ARMS index, have substantial positive autocorrelations, while the first differences have significant firstlag autocorrelations that are negative except for the II ratio.
13 Table 2 contains the contemporaneous correlations between the sentiment measures and the other variables, namely returns and realized volatility. We find that ARMS has a substantial negative correlation with returns, between -0.7 and -0.8, for all periods considered. ARMS also has a small positive correlation with log realized volatility.
The correlations are reduced when the first differences of ARMS are used.
As regards the put-call volume ratios, we find that they are more correlated with returns than volatility. The correlations between the volume ratio, PCV, and returns are more substantial for the daily frequency than the weekly frequency and they are similar for either the level or the change in PCV. The open interest ratio, PCO, has more substantial correlations for the weekly frequency than the daily frequency, that are negative with returns and positive with volatility.
There is evidence of non-negligible correlation between our survey based measures of sentiment and both returns and realized volatility. Small correlations are observed for both the levels and the first differences of the survey variables.
Granger causality tests

Methodology
On the way to investigate the predictive power of sentiment for returns and realized volatility, first we run Granger causality tests to determine whether there exists any Granger-causality relationship among them. The results are given in this section. Then, in the next section, we try to discover if the sentiment measures that have a causal effect can be used for forecasting purposes. This requires us to look more deeply at the relationship between returns, volatility and sentiment.
We test for Granger causality between sentiment and returns by estimating bivariate VAR models. We test for causality in both directions. We also test for causal relationships between sentiment and realized volatility, and between returns and volatility. The degrees-of-freedom of the LR test depend on the number of lags used in the vector autoregressions. To determine the appropriate number of lags, we optimize the Akaike Information Criterion. The optimal number of lags depends on the pair of variables used in the causality tests; it varies between 2 and 12 for the daily data and between 2 and 6 for the weekly data.
Results
The results of the Granger causality tests using sentiment measures and returns are presented in Table 3 . There is very limited evidence that sentiment, however measured, Granger-causes returns at either the daily or the weekly frequency. However, we find strong and consistent evidence that all sentiment measures, in levels and first differences, are Granger-caused by returns; all the likelihood ratio statistics are significant at the 1% level for the full sample. Thus, we find stronger evidence that sentiment measures are not causal variables but are in fact the variables being caused.
These results confirm the findings of Brown and Cliff (2004) who also show that returns cause sentiment.
The results of the Granger causality tests using sentiment measures and volatility are presented in Table 4 . First, consider the daily data. There is no significant evidence that the levels or first differences of either PCV or PCO Granger-cause realized volatility. However, there is compelling evidence that the levels and first differences of these sentiment measures are caused by realized volatility, with all four likelihood ratios significant at the 1% level. ARMS produces very different results to all the other sentiment measures. There is significant evidence of two-way causality, with stronger evidence for causality running from sentiment to volatility than from volatility to sentiment. Next, consider the weekly data. The null hypothesis that sentiment does not cause volatility is accepted for the AAII, PCV and PCO variables at the 10% level (full sample) but is rejected at the 1% level by the II survey variable.
However, there is again much more evidence for causality in the other direction: the null hypothesis that volatility does not cause sentiment is rejected at the 1% level for the AAII, II and PCO variables (full sample).
14 We have also tested for causal relationships between returns and realized volatility.
The results of these tests are presented in Table 5 and show that returns strongly
Granger-cause volatility rather than vice versa.
Three conclusions can be drawn from Tables 3, 4 and 5, with causality defined by Granger's methodology. Firstly, sentiment does not cause returns but rather returns cause sentiment. Secondly sentiment variables apart from ARMS do not consistently cause realized volatility. Our findings suggest that most of the sentiment measures used here should not be used for realized volatility forecasting purposes. All sentiment measures apart from ARMS appear to be caused by realized volatility. Thirdly returns cause realized volatility.
Tests of the forecasting power of ARMS for realized volatility
Two of the most frequently used variables for forecasting realized volatility are historical volatility and volatilities implied from options. Numerous papers, surveyed
by Poon and Granger (2003) , have examined the forecasting power of these variables.
The general conclusion of papers such as Fleming (1998), Christensen and Prabhala (1998) and Blair et al (2001) is that both implied and lagged volatility have considerable forecasting power, with implied volatility being the more accurate predictor.
To see whether ARMS could be a useful forecasting variable we therefore decided to examine whether it could enhance forecasts of the realized volatility of S&P 100 index returns that are computed from either lagged realized volatility or implied volatility represented by the VIX index. 15 We therefore estimated two benchmark regressions for logarithmic variables, one that used five lags of lagged realized volatility 16 to forecast realized volatility and another that used lagged implied volatility to forecast realized volatility. After estimating these benchmark models we investigated whether adding the level of ARMS and then its first differences can 
where V t is the realized volatility at time t. When VIX is used instead as the benchmark forecast the following equation is estimated:
When the first differences of ARMS are included, the regression equation is specified as:
for the case where lagged realized volatility defines the benchmark forecast and where and are dummy variables that are respectively one if the change in ARMS is positive and one if the change in ARMS is negative. In the case where VIX defines the benchmark forecast, the regression equation is
From Table 6 , we find that ARMS does consistently enhance the benchmark models in a statistically significant manner. The null hypothesis that ARMS can not improve forecasts is rejected at the 1% level in all cases, although the increment in the adjusted 2 R is small (between 0.24% and 1.24% for the full sample). Thus it appears that ARMS does contain useful statistical information for forecasting purposes. The sign of the ARMS coefficient 'γ ' in equations 1 and 2 indicates that as ARMS rises and the market becomes more bearish, future realized volatility rises.
17
The leverage (or asymmetric volatility) effect is well documented in the volatility literature and describes the fact that as prices or returns fall volatility is more likely to rise. It is therefore possible that the relationship between ARMS and future realized volatility that we detect could be spurious and may merely be a consequence of the leverage effect, because ARMS reflects the market direction which is demonstrated by its correlation of -0.7 with returns as seen in Table 2 . To assess the hypothesis of a spurious effect we added the S&P 100 return into our forecasting equations. These equations are formulated recognizing that the leverage effect relates volatility shocks to an asymmetric function of returns. For the case that uses the level of sentiment, we estimate the following equation: with equal to one if is negative and zero otherwise.
The results are shown in Table 7 . We find that the adjusted 2 R of the benchmark models that contain returns are significantly higher than those that do not contain returns: the null hypothesis 0 = α is always rejected at the 1% level. Furthermore, Table 6 (where ARMS replaces returns). The predictive power of ARMS becomes very limited when returns are included in the benchmark models. No matter in which form and with which benchmark variables, the incremental 2 R for the ARMS variable is then between 0.04% and 0.17% for the full sample. Although some of the coefficients of ARMS are still statistically significant in Table 7, for forecasting purposes the improvement made by ARMS is negligible and therefore of no economic significance. Nevertheless, we can conclude that a non-linear function of returns may enhance forecasts of realized volatility that are calculated from implied volatility and/or lagged realized volatility.
Concluding remarks
Risk managers and regulators are periodically required to forecast volatility whilst those working in the fund management industry frequently attempt to predict security returns. In this paper, we look at whether sentiment, measured using information from derivatives, spot markets and surveys, can be used to enhance these forecasts. In addition, recognizing that sentiment itself is affected by recent market behavior, we seek to determine the direction of any causal relationships.
Our analysis is conducted in two steps using equity market data. In the first step, we investigate the direction of causality between various measures of sentiment, returns and realized volatility to determine which of these variables might be useful for forecasting purposes. We find that most sentiment indicators, except ARMS, the ratio of the average volume of advancing versus declining issues, are caused by realized volatility rather than vice versa. We also detect that sentiment indicators are caused by returns and that returns predict realized volatility.
We test whether these causal relationships can be exploited in the second step by examining if ARMS and returns are of use for realized volatility forecasting purposes.
As the commonly used benchmark models for predicting realized volatility use either lagged realized volatility or implied volatility, we test for the incremental predictive power of ARMS and returns to these benchmark models. We find that ARMS has predictive power for future realized volatility but that this is limited once returns are included. However, equity returns systematically improve the prediction of future realized equity market volatility.
Thus we do not observe a visible link between sentiment measures and realised volatility or returns as predicted by the theoretical literature. Our research design and results lend no support to the hypothesis that noise traders influence either returns or volatility.
To conclude, there is very limited evidence that sentiment, however measured, provides incremental information for forecasts of returns and volatility. Any such incremental information is unlikely to be economically significant. By contrast, all sentiment measures are caused by returns and volatility. Our results also indicate that returns may be useful in predicting realized volatility.
Endnotes:
1 Forecasting realized volatility is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, the future behavior of realized volatility has an impact on current derivatives prices. Secondly, it is a required input for many models that calculate value at risk. For example, Riskmetrics requires a volatility estimate to calculate value at risk.
2 Our paper focuses on sentiment measured at the aggregate level rather than the security specific level. 3 The ARMS index is named after its creator Richard Arms and is defined in Section 3. 4 We were unable to use a weekly measure of the ARMS index as the data is not compiled.
5 Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) show that the more frequent the observations, the more accurate the measure in theory. It is impossible in reality to obtain a continuous dataset because of the discontinuities in the price process and the market microstructure effects such as bid-ask spreads and nonsynchronous trading effects. 6 Weekly PCV is calculated as the sum of daily put trading volume over the week divided by the sum of daily call trading volume over the week. Weekly PCO is the open interest calculated on the last trading day of the week. 7 The relationship between ARMS and whether the market is bearish or bullish may not be clear cut.
Let us suppose the market has been falling broadly across the majority of stocks and ARMS has risen.
It is only if market participants perceive that the level of the market has reached a low enough point that a recovery will follow and only then can ARMS be treated as a bullish measure. Before that point is reached, high trading volume in declining stock may simply be treated as a sign that the market will continue to fall. 8 The average response rate of the AAII survey is about 50% with a standard deviation of 15%.
9 AAII mails the questionnaires, and members fill them out and return them via US mail. Each week AAII collects responses from Friday to the following Thursday and reports the results on Thursday or Friday. 10 In the case of both the AAII and the II measures, there is a time lag between responses and reporting.
If we want to look at the true relationship between sentiment in week t and subsequent market behavior it might be argued that we should actually work with the AAII or II measures reported one or two weeks ahead to overcome this reporting lag. Whilst these measures reported in week t+1 or week t+2 might more accurately reflect sentiment at week t, market participants would not have such information to hand in week t to predict subsequent market behavior. Hence in our analysis of the forecasting role of sentiment that follows we do not temporally adjust our AAII or II measures.
11 This point is made by Solt and Statman(1988) . 12 In our analysis we work with the logarithm of realized volatility as in log form it is much closer to being normally distributed than the original variable (Andersen et al (2001)). 13 All the sentiment time series appear to be stationary, and all reject the unit root null hypothesis at the 1% level (augmented Dickey Fuller test, with four lags). Interestingly the ARMS index has a low level of autocorrelation and so appears to be close to a white noise process. Thus it is not surprising that the first-lag autocorrelation of the first differences is close to -0.5.
14 In some of our sub samples the II index does significantly Granger-cause realized volatility. These results are similar to the results shown in Lee et al (2002) . However as the causality is not consistent across all measurement periods we do not use II as a forecasting variable. 15 For the implied volatility measure, the VIX index of Fleming et al (1995) is used. It is a weighted index of eight American option implied volatilities calculated from the closest to at-the-money call and put options of the two most nearby expiration months. These eight implied volatilities are weighted so that VIX represents the average implied volatility of an at-the-money option one month before expiration. 16 Five lags were selected by optimizing the Akaike Information Criterion. 17 As there was weak evidence that the II index Granger caused realized volatility in the first step of our analysis (which was not consistent across periods) we decided to run similar tests to those carried out above using the II index instead of ARMS. We found that the incremental adjusted R 2 s of the II index when forecasting realized volatility range from -0.18% to 1.44% and most of them are less than 1%. Thus we conclude that the II index is not a reliable indicator for volatility forecasting purposes. 
